

# THE COLLINS CENTER UPDATE

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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE  
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## OBSERVATIONS FROM OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

By COL Eugene L. Thompson  
Joint and Multinational Issues Branch

From 2 to 26 January, the Center for Strategic Leadership supported a Third Army/Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and U.S. Army War College (USAWC) initiative to observe and to gain insights from Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). The intent of the mission was to contribute to the development of FM 3-93, The Army in Theater Operations, and to facilitate outreach and information flow between CFLCC and the USAWC.

COL John Bonin, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations (DMSPO) traveled to Kuwait, established

Commandant and to key members of the staff and faculty. Some highlights follow.

- The early stages of land warfare during OEF were dominated by “unconventional warfare” and will provide valuable lessons learned for low intensity conflict. However, the operation will not likely provide a model for all future missions. Conventional architectures and operations often supported unconventional operations during this period, vice the norm of unconventional operations supporting conventional operations.

- Achieving war aims through “unconventional” means requires “operational patience” at the Theater and National level.

- Geography, political circumstances, and the desirability of maintaining a small land forces footprint created an impetus for executing OEF more in consonance with the vision of a twenty-first century



contact with CFLCC, and set the conditions for the mission during December of 2001. COL Gene Thompson, CSL, followed. Traveling also to Uzbekistan and Afghanistan, he focused his observations on the overall architecture of land operations during the initial stages of OEF. COL Kevin Weddle, DMSPO, further investigated initial observations and focused on theater support architectures during his travel from 26 January to 16 February.

Before returning from theater, the team handed over approximately forty principal and supporting observations about joint and Army operations in support of OEF to the CFLCC Command Group.

After returning to Carlisle Barracks, these observations were also provided to the

“battlespace” than a twentieth century battlefield architecture.

- Non-contiguous landlines of communication and limited availability of intra-theater airlift constrained the ways and means for executing land warfare.

- Advanced technology facilitated a greater span of control and concurrent staffing/planning. However, hardware and software have not been integrated into the force sufficiently, and therefore, there is neither the robustness nor depth to obviate the need for any current Army command structures, from squad through theater army.

- Army structures must become more modular in nature (“plug and play”). They must be flexible enough to mix and match discrete elements of any organization—

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including individual personnel—in order to establish required capabilities to accomplish land warfare missions. This needs to be supported by systems and software, policy and procedural changes, and adjustments in the culture and professional education of the Army.

- Security Cooperative (Theater Engagement) is a continuous mission, not a tasking. Previous S.C. efforts were instrumental in enabling USCENTCOM and CFLCC to establish access in theater, which was critical early for OEF.

- Support and sustainment doctrine must be more fully integrated with other services. All levels of command must understand terms such as “Common Item Support” and “Common Level of Support”.

- For a variety of reasons, Army TOE organizations have leveraged “echelons above” support heavily, stressing theater support systems. For example, pre-positioning has mitigated strategic movement requirements, however, it has added a further burden on intra-theater movement assets.

- The blurring of strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war is occurring in two directions simultaneously: top to bottom, and bottom to top. Some, but not all, of the impetus for change may be tied to advancements in technology. Efforts to flatten the Army’s hierarchical structures to take advantage of technological advances must consider organizational function and cultural issues.

The War College will continue to maintain contact with CFLCC as their operations in support of the global war on terrorism mature.

## **SUPPORT TO THE NEAR EAST SOUTH ASIA CENTER’S EXECUTIVE SEMINAR**

*By Professor Bernard F. Griffard*  
Joint and Multinational Support Branch

The Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA) is the fifth regional study center established by the Department of Defense. Its mission is to enhance stability in the Near East and South Asia region by providing a professional academic environment where key security issues of the region can be addressed, mutual understanding is deepened, partnerships are fostered, security-related decision making is improved, and cooperation is strengthened among military and civilian security professionals from the region and from the United States.

One of the academic fora that NESA uses to engage current and future defense and diplomatic leaders in the region is the

Executive Seminar, an intensive, three-week-long program intended to stimulate and direct an exchange on strategic issues among national security professionals of the region. The recent seminar theme, “Global Challenges/ Rethinking National Strategy,” encompassed discussions on the impact of globalization and information technology, the transformation in military affairs, counter-terrorism, deterrence, ballistic missile defense, and disaster management.



Due to his experience in using the topic of Disaster Management in regional seminars conducted by the U.S. Central Command, NESA invited CSL’s Professor Bernard F. Griffard to make a presentation to the members of the Executive Seminar on January 30, 2002. Professor Griffard’s presentation explored the influence of realistic environmental security programs and effective disaster management planning on regional security. It also set the scene for the Strategic Issues Forum conducted on January 31, 2002, in which the participants devised a multinational strategy for dealing with environmental disaster.

Basing his presentation on the results of two recent Central Asian disaster management conferences, Professor Griffard discussed some of nature’s toughest disaster management challenges: earthquakes, floods, and hurricanes. He also explored man-made disasters such as oil spills, poor land management, and inadequate industrial waste disposal planning. The message to the seminar members was that the existence of effective disaster management planning and coordination mechanisms at all levels of government is a primary tool for maintaining the people’s confidence in the face of an environmental, or man-made, crisis.

## **VIGILANT WARRIOR 2002**


*By COL Jerry Johnson,*  
Department of the Army Support Branch

In preparation for the annual Army Transformation Wargame (ATWG)—a major

element in its overall effort in support of the Army’s transformation to the “Objective Force”—the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) conducted a series of five Senior Wargame Seminars at Fort Monroe, Virginia, between July 2001 and March 2002. The Army War College participated at some level in each of these events. Most recently, the Commandant, Major General Robert Ivany, and Colonels John Bonin and Jerry Johnson participated in Senior Wargame Seminars IV and V in preparation for their roles as players in the upcoming ATWG. During these Senior Wargame Seminars, the Army War College participants contributed by preparing such products as the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield and Courses of Action that will be used in one of the ATWG scenarios. Additionally, they were able to assist TRADOC School Commandants and senior TRADOC leaders with the development and refinement of other concepts to support the overall transformation effort.

Army War College resident course students will also support this ATWG by serving as players and analysts. These students take an elective course of instruction, focused on Army transformation, that prepares them for future assignments in support of the Army’s transformation efforts. These students will gain significant insights on Army Transformation as they provide important support for the wargame.

The next Collins Center Update will provide further information on the conduct and initial insights from the 2002 ATWG, entitled “Vigilant Warriors,” which will be hosted by the Center for Strategic Leadership and the U.S. Army War College in April.





## **DEPARTMENT OF STATE** **STRATEGIC PLANNING** **WORKSHOP II**

*By COL Jeffrey C. Reynolds*  
National Security Issues Branch

The Center for Strategic Leadership hosted fifty-two Department of State leaders at a workshop conducted 4-5 February 2002 at the Collins Center. The purpose of the workshop was to expose State Department participants to the Army's strategic planning process and how that process is integrated into the professional development of the officer corps. Participants learned about the Army's institutional planning processes, the integration of planning in professional military education, and military strategic planning concepts and methodologies. Participants then met in facilitated groups that discussed future visioning, diplomatic planning, and training and education requirements at the Department of State. These breakout groups presented their conclusions in a plenary session before the conference adjourned.

In formulating a strategy for planning and education at the Department of State, the strategic planner should consider what the future world might be like, so the organization can identify the core competencies of the Department of State and its workforce at some time in the future. Workshop participants envisioned the role of diplomats in 2025 as legitimizing the U.S. message to the world. Future diplomats will need the skills to manage multinational situations involving nongovernmental and international organizations, corporations, and governments as allies in trade and public diplomacy. These individual skills include multidisciplinary capabilities and awareness, deep language and cultural specialization, interagency agility, and a practical understanding of information technology.

The group strongly suggested that the future mid-level Foreign Service Officer be a diplomatic practitioner, not a supporting player, at the overseas mission. This workshop recommended that senior leadership at State set a vision that would energize the organization toward establishing diplomacy as a key instrument of national power.

The diplomacy and planning workshop reviewed the mechanisms and organizations responsible for strategic planning at State. The group's consensus was that existing strategic planning processes and mechanisms can and should be improved, but no major revamping of those planning

mechanisms should be undertaken. The group believed that the current leadership at State was taking an active role in strategic planning and that the current planning and budgeting process was improving, but this group also thought that the department continues to lack a culture of planning.

The group recommended developing more concise and relevant Mission Performance Plans (MPP) and Bureau Performance Plans (BPP) and proposed increasing emphasis on accountability and performance. This workshop further recommended implementing structured professional development, adding a personnel float for education, and reflecting work on MPPs or BPPs on annual performance reviews. Participants also saw a need for a crisis contingency fund, to enable resources to be allocated quickly during crises without raiding Bureau programs.

Historically, the State Department's culture tolerates training to achieve finite ends. With the exception of required entry level and deputy chief of mission level courses, State does not have a professional education program that reinforces core values and prepares professionals for future assignments over the course of a career. The education and training workshop group proposed that State develop a professional education program that identifies values and core competencies and adds leadership, policy, planning, and resource management education for its mid-level employees.

The workshop identified numerous impediments to changing the nature of education at State. Historically, there has been no personnel float, and many supervisors and managers perceive training and education as a negative, with all attendees taken "out of hide." This group wanted to see top leadership drive personnel management and educational change at State. They recommend that promotion and assignment of professionals be linked to an individual's completion of mandatory training, and they proposed that incentive pay be added or increased for acquired skills. The group called for adding flexibility to increase Civil Service assignment mobility. The overall goal of the initiative should be to institutionalize training and education as integral components of the career development of all State Department employees.

This group identified a cogent requirement to establish a mid-level overseas tradecraft course. The curriculum would emphasize State Department core values and competencies, grand strategy, planning and budgeting, and the interagency process. It would focus on refreshing and strengthening the skills, knowledge, and policy awareness required in functioning as a mid-level diplomat overseas.

By establishing a more formal and integrated professional education and development program, the Department of State stands to gain organizational cohesion and inter-



**More than fifty senior State Department personnel were exposed to the military's strategic planning process in February's Strategic Planning Workshop.**

agency respect, enhance its planning capability, and strengthen its application of the power of diplomacy.

## **EIGHTH STRATEGIC CRISIS EXERCISE**

*By Col Mark Van Drie*

Army War College Support Branch

The U.S. Army War College's eighth Strategic Crisis Exercise (SCE) concluded on 22 March 2002. SCE is the capstone exercise of the U.S. Army War College curriculum and involves all 334 students and numerous subject matter experts and VIPs. SCE applies the knowledge gained during the first seven months of the resident course in an experiential exercise where students role-play policy makers in a world in crisis. It is the most complex, realistic strategic exercise in the world. SCE is dynamic and changes to reflect current national security issues as reflected in the 16 scenarios that drive student actions.

The issue of Homeland Security was included for the first time and forced students to grapple with the same complex issues facing our nation's leaders. Representatives from the FBI, Justice Department, the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency and its federal counterpart, FEMA, joined staff and faculty as controllers for the homeland security portion of the exercise. When students needed to talk with someone from the FBI, Justice, or FEMA, the students got the opportunity to interact with representatives from the actual agencies. Other changes included moving the notional year of the events played in the exercise from 2009 to 2013. In the year 2013, the Army is



A War College student "meets the press" in a mock interview during SCE 2002.

well into its transformation process, with seven Interim Brigade Combat Teams and four Objective Force Brigade Combat Teams available for the students to employ in the notional conflicts. The Center for Strategic Leadership had also hypothesized, correctly, that there would be a Commander-in-Chief (CINC) responsible for coordinating Homeland Security for North America and had included America's Command, or AMCOM, before the Department of Defense announced its intent to create Northern Command. Other significant changes included a deployed missile defense capability and a more robust North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with three new members. Despite these and other changes, many crises and issues depicted in the exercise are

surprisingly similar to events happening around the world today. Army War College students are still immersed in the "volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous" world of strategic leadership and must deal with these issues. Over 40% of the student population served as a strategic leader at some point during the exercise. Each faced the media and interfaced with a Cabinet-level principal, a sitting Congressmen, or a Special Assistant to the President.

The SCE continues to develop strategic leaders. Students learn and understand the complexities of strategic leadership through the experiential learning that occurs during the exercise. In the final analysis, SCE fulfills critical learning objectives of the Army War College.

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This publication and other CSL publications can be found online at [http:// www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/index.asp](http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/index.asp).

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